\u3ci\u3eEthics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life\u3c/i\u3e by Arthur Isak Applbaum by Sabia, Daniel R.
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications Political Science, Department of
6-2000
Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public
and Professional Life by Arthur Isak Applbaum
Daniel R. Sabia
University of South Carolina - Columbia, sabia@sc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/poli_facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Book Review is brought to you by the Political Science, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Publication Info
Published in American Political Science Review, Volume 94, Issue 2, 2000, pages 443-444.
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PSR
© 2000 by Cambridge University Press
American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 2 June 2000 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Political Theory 
Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and 
Professional Life. By Arthur Isak Applbaum. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. 288p. $29.95. 
Dan Sabia, University of South Carolina 
Impressive substantive knowledge, analytical rigor, and Kan- 
tian and liberal democratic commitments are all in play in 
this careful exploration of the morality of roles in adversary 
institutions. Extending the concept from its usual location in 
accounts of legal, especially criminal, representation in the 
American legal system, adversary institutions and professions 
are conceived as practices in which role players like business 
executives, lawyers, public officials and bureaucrats adopt 
partisan and limited, and therefore often conflicting, perspec- 
tives and interests, and claim the right to intentionally harm 
others, on the ground that such partiality, conflict, and 
conduct will help promote or secure valued outcomes or 
goods such as prosperity, justice, and legitimate government. 
The "central question" addressed in the book is how acting 
in an adversary institution and role can morally justify or 
"morally permit actions that otherwise would be morally 
wrong" (p. 10). Many common justifications are examined, 
and all are found to be "weaker than [often] supposed." 
Adversary "institutions and the roles they create ordinarily 
cannot mint moral permissions to do what otherwise would 
be morally prohibited" (p. 3). 
A very brief account of the main justifications considered, 
and criticisms made, follows. Adversaries may try to defend 
themselves by appealing to role prescriptions, including 
permissions to harm, as if their mere existence justified 
compliance. But the argument of chapter 3 is that roles have 
no "independent moral force or ... grounding," and there- 
fore cannot by themselves create moral obligations or per- 
missions to do anything, much less anything wrong (p. 45). 
Another defense, explored in chapter 4, is that a role which 
has moral value imposes on its occupants moral obligations 
"to defer to authority and comply with its rules," including 
the common rule demanding neutrality, or the suspension of 
personal judgment regarding the substantive merits of what 
one is supposed to do (p. 60). Focusing on civil servants in a 
liberal democratic setting, the author contends to the con- 
trary that the suspension of political and moral judgments 
regarding both the legitimacy and justice of authoritative 
orders and policies is unacceptable since the morality of the 
role and its obligations presuppose the legitimacy of both and 
of any actions they may prescribe. Unreflective deference is 
never justified; resistance and disobedience sometimes is. 
Ensuing chapters canvass more interesting and challenging 
defenses. Chapter 5 examines "the strategy of redescription" 
or the claim that professional practices and roles "create new 
ways of acting that can be judged only by the rules of the 
practice" (p. 10). Rules governing the legal profession, for 
instance, permit or require a variety of deceitful actions 
which, however, are said to be misdescribed as deceitful; 
actually, these actions are forms of zealous advocacy, and 
they are legitimate, even obligatory, and cannot possibly be 
moral wrongs. Acknowledging that this strategy tracks com- 
pelling accounts of how social practices can constitute action 
descriptions (by, e.g., John R. Searle, Speech Acts, 1969), the 
author nonetheless mounts a successful critique of it. The 
essential point is that the strategy fails because it forgets that 
institutionally constituted action descriptions (or redescrip- 
tions) are not exclusive or even privileged. Although it is true 
that "practice-defined descriptions can be judged only by the 
terms set out by the practice," it is not true that a "practice- 
defined description is the only apt description" (p. 91). Thus, 
while advocacy that involves misleading jurors or litigants is 
on most accounts of legal practice truly good or competent 
legal behavior, it is also deceitful behavior that needs to be, 
if one cares about morality, justified. Moral scrutiny is not 
blocked by redescription. 
Another justification of harmful advocacy behavior, dis- 
cussed in chapter 6, appeals to rules of the game. The defense 
is that victims consent to, or as a matter of fairness must 
accept, their treatment, much as players in a game of poker 
must accept being targets of deceit. The key criticism of the 
consent argument, made before by many writers (e.g., Sissela 
Bok, Lying, 1978, and Dennis Thompson, Political Ethics and 
Public Office, 1987), is that it asserts what is usually false: 
Victims of adversary practices typically do not consent to 
being mistreated. The argument from fair play reflects a 
careful reworking of well-known literature asserting, and 
questioning, the idea that persons may incur obligations to do 
their part in a just scheme of cooperation by virtue of their 
voluntary acceptance of benefits provided by others in that 
scheme; the reworking holds that permissions to harm per- 
sons are justified if they accept or receive benefits in a just 
scheme. The author's basic criticism of this argument is that, 
at least in games of market competition, electoral politics, 
and adversary law, consumers, citizens, and litigants are 
typically neither advantaged by, nor do they voluntarily seek, 
the games' benefits. "Business managers, public officials, and 
lawyers may satisfy the conditions of fair play in their 
deceptive or coercive dealings with one another," however, so 
when they are deceived or coerced they "may have no 
reasonable grounds for complaint" (p. 135). 
In the longest and most technical chapter of the book, 
chapter 7, the author explores defenses that reflect and 
develop debates between consequentialists and Kantians 
concerning the permissibility of intentional harm. Consider- 
able effort is expended establishing a "conceptual case for 
morally permissible violations of persons [on nonconsequen- 
tialist or Kantian grounds]" (p. 173). When refusing to violate 
a person(s) is "self-defeating" because the person(s) will 
suffer a more serious violation as a result, or when refusing is 
"Pareto-inferior" because the person(s) will suffer anyway 
and others will as well, a Kantian can ("with reluctance and 
regret") justifiably violate the person(s), knowing that "rea- 
sonable" persons would, ex ante, consent to such treatment 
(pp. 150, 165). After making this "conceptual" argument, the 
author (with unintended irony) explains that it provides little 
help for those who would defend most of the violations 
adversary practices permit, since those practices typically 
permit violations in circumstances that would not warrant 
reasonable consent (although there are exceptions which the 
author describes). 
A final defense, or set of related defenses, is examined in 
chapter 7, where the focus is on appeals to the social goods 
secured by adversary institutions. One central criticism of 
such appeals is that they characteristically exaggerate the 
good results adversarial practices manage to produce. An- 
other is that, even if some adversary practice does produce, 
overall, good outcomes, this can at best justify institutional 
permissions to harm but not, necessarily or automatically, 
intentional harming. This is so for two reasons: First, partic- 
ular cases of harming may not serve, they may even under- 
mine or subvert, the ends which justify institutional permis- 
sions; second, even if the end and action of an adversary 
agent in a particular case does serve good institutional 
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purposes, intentionally harming others is not thereby justi- 
fied. Good ends alone do not justify wrongful behavior. 
This last point, of course, is a conclusion compelled by the 
author's commitment to Kantianism; it is not, therefore, 
wholly compelling. It would not persuade adversaries and 
defenders of adversarial practices who knowingly embrace 
some variety of moral consequentialism. Perhaps the central 
weakness of this thoughtful book is the author's admission 
that "if consequentialism is the correct moral theory, there is 
no serious objection to an adversary institution that produces 
enough social good to outweigh ... the bad" (pp. 176-7). A 
related weakness is his relative neglect of what might be 
termed the phenomenology of role playing, which can explain 
not only why adversaries and other role occupants may be 
deaf to the demands of morality but also may make particular 
moral judgments of which he cannot approve (see, e.g., 
Elizabeth Wolgast, Ethics of an Artificial Person, 1992). 
Because I have focused on the central question addressed 
by the author, I have neglected other chapters, and virtues, in 
the book. Well-written, full of interesting cases and real and 
imagined examples, Applbaum has drawn on much of his 
previously published work to present an illuminating and 
forceful critique of the arguments even good people in 
professional and political life employ to justify the bad things 
they do. For those interested in role morality and profes- 
sional ethics, and who appreciate the style and results of 
analytical moral and political philosophy done by the likes of 
Nagel and Williams, Rawls and Dworkin, David Luban and 
Dennis Thompson, Ethics for Adversaries is a must read. 
Undergraduates would probably find it a hard go. 
Why I Am Not a Secularist. By William E. Connolly. Minne- 
apolis:- University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 210p. $29.95. 
J. Donald Moon, Wesleyan University 
This is the latest in a series of works in which Connolly has 
been interrogating liberalism and its fellow travelers. Draw- 
ing on thinkers such as Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, and 
Arendt, he has become one of liberalism's deepest and most 
original critics today. And he is one of liberalism's most 
valuable critics, in part because his own intellectual journey 
begins with the experiences and preoccupations that led to 
liberalism. This is evident in the title of this work, which 
echoes and pays homage to Bertrand Russell's Why IAm Not 
a Christian, a text that is very much in the tradition of the 
secularism Connolly criticizes. It is also reflected in an 
engaging biographical story that introduces the work, in 
which Connolly describes how at a tender age he came to be 
an atheist. But for Connolly, liberalism generally and secu- 
larism in particular do not provide viable accounts of these 
experiences, or answers to these concerns. 
Connolly conceives of "secularism" broadly, as the "wish to 
provide an authoritative and self-sufficient public space 
equipped to regulate and limit 'religious' disputes in public 
life" (p. 5). Thus, secularism offers itself as the alternative to 
the aggrandizing claims of religious truth to constitute the 
moral and political center of society, an alternative that 
becomes increasingly attractive as religious truth becomes 
religious truths and competing visions lead to sectarian 
conflict and violence. But in offering itself as the new center 
for political life,_ secularism commits the same errors as its 
traditional antagonists; although only one voice in the con- 
versation, it sets itself up as the single, authoritative source to 
adjudicate the differences among the others. In doing so it 
fails to see its own limitations, and it creates its own forms of 
dogmatism and intolerance, which, ironically, intensify the 
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very forms of sectarian conflict that it was intended to 
overcome. 
Perhaps the greatest failing of secularism is its faith in 
reason, or rather a certain conception of reason, one that is 
blind to what Connolly calls "the visceral register of subjec- 
tivity and intersubjectivity" (p. 24). Drawing on various 
sources, including recent brain research, Connolly insists that 
thinking, remembering, and feeling cannot be reduced to or 
modeled in terms of conscious, linguistically formulated 
processes of thought. Ethical life, similarly, should not be 
seen as enacting (or conforming our actions to) our beliefs 
and ideals but includes practices that actively engage "the 
visceral register of being" (p. 29). Public life cannot even in 
principle be a matter of pure argument delivering authorita- 
tive judgments that all rational citizens must, on account of 
their being rational, accept; rather, it is "always accompanied 
and informed ... by visceral intensities of thinking, prejudg- 
ment, and sensibility" (p. 36). And that can be a good thing, 
since it can lead to creativity and new forms of communica- 
tion. 
Not surprisingly, if there is a single figure with whom 
Connolly is wrestling in these pages, it is Kant and his 
contemporary descendants, notably Habermas and Rawls. 
Much of the book consists of sustained engagements with 
these figures, but it also addresses the political failings of a 
secular vision of politics, including the war against drugs, the 
use of the death penalty, and the debate over a right to 
assisted suicide. Running throughout these analyses is what 
we might call a therapeutic intention, an effort to wean us 
away from the need for unity, for structure, for authoritative 
centers and control. One of Connolly's favorite images is the 
rhizome, literally a root-like structure consisting of a system 
of interconnected roots, tubers, stems, and so on, with no 
single or main stem to which they all feed. Culturally and 
politically, Connolly calls on us to embrace what he calls 
"deep pluralism," whereby we are connected to others in a 
variety of ways, organizing ourselves into a complex array of 
partially overlapping and intersecting associations, without 
the need for a common center, whether it be the idealized 
nation or the majesty of public reason or even the purity of 
Arendtian politics. Against the secularist strategy of insulat- 
ing political life from contested religious or metaphysical 
views, we should embrace a politics of contestation in which 
conflicting perspectives are admitted into political life. By 
embracing these conflicts, rather than seeking to transcend 
them, we are more likely to come to see the contestability of 
our own moral sources and to discover new possibilities- 
new questions, new ways of engaging with others, new 
alternatives. The strategy of secularism was an effort to avoid 
conflict by retreating to an ever more rarified conception of 
the public realm, and it has failed. Instead, we need a 
"democratic ethos of engagement across multidimensional 
lines of difference" that is "jointed to a sensibility that affirms 
the ambiguity of being and the deep contingency of things" 
(p. 186). 
This is an attractive vision. Connolly is correct to argue that 
the "reciprocal acknowledgment" by all that "no party has 
shown its perspective to be undeniable" could widen the 
scope for a "politics of forbearance, generosity, and selective 
collaboration between interdependent partisans" (p. 187). 
But one wonders how real a break this is from the politics of 
secularism. In the first place, secularism also demands that 
we reciprocally acknowledge the contestability of our own 
positions, and it is precisely this demand that has been-and 
is being-resisted by those who seek to embody their own 
ideals in legislation and public policy. But more important, it 
is hard to see how Connolly's "ethos of forbearance and 
